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In English there is a group of words that are called slurs. These words target people based on 
their group membership, picking out a certain ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, etc., and 
communicate the speakers’ negative attitudes about them (Hom, 2010; Bolinger, 2015).1 
Throughout this Bachelor's thesis, I will be using examples of offensive language. I do not 
endorse the use of this kind of vocabulary in either Estonian or English but utilising the terms 
in arguments is necessary for explaining their behaviour in a social context. 
 
There is no consensus about whether slurs as a category exist in Estonian and there are 
disagreements about Estonian words that sound similar to English slurs. One of these words is 
neeger that closely resembles nigger in pronunciation and spelling. The characteristics people 
debate are derogatoriness and offensiveness. In this thesis I will take a word to be derogatory 
iff it communicates a negative evaluation of the target, regardless of the speaker’s beliefs about 
the situation (Hom & May, 2013, p. 210). Derogating someone would mean that a specific 
speech act is committed through which individuals are attributed negative characteristics (Hom 
& May, 2018). A word is offensive iff using it elicits a psychological response in the target to 
content that is negative. Offensiveness is psychological and behavioural – A can be offended 
by claim x while B is not offended (ibid.). A word can be derogatory, yet not offensive in a 
particular context and offensive for some person Y, yet not derogatory. 
 
My central claim in this Bachelor’s thesis is that the false friends arguments presented by 
Priimägi (2013; Linnar…, 2017), Pullerits (2013) and Ots (2012) are unsound. Proponents of 
these arguments claim that neeger is a false friend of nigger because the former does not satisfy 
necessary conditions that the latter does. I will argue that this premise is false and that neeger 
also meets the criteria nigger is held to. My defence of this claim falls into two sections. In the 
first section, I will define false friends and sketch out two false friends arguments: the linguistic 
authority argument and the cultural differences argument. 
 
I claim that the linguistic authority argument assumes two conditions on a word being slur-
like: firstly, if a word is slur-like, then the dictionary listing must feature the relevant marker. 
                                                        
1 Hereinafter, I will not take communicating to be factive, i.e. I do not assume that the communicated content P 
is true. 
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Secondly, neeger is unmarked in the dictionary. In this thesis, I will focus more on the cultural 
differences argument but also claim that none of the examined philosophical accounts (Hom 
(2008; 2010, 2012); Hom & May 2013, 2018), Camp (2013; 2018), Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 
(2018), Nunberg (2018), Schlenker (2007), Cepollaro (2015); Potts (2005; 2007), McCready 
(2010); Anderson & Lepore (2013; Anderson, 2018)) consider dictionary practices to be 
relevant to whether a word is a slur. Because of this, the lack of a marker implies neither that 
the word is slur-like nor that it is not. 
 
I claim that the cultural differences argument also assumes two conditions on a word being 
slur-like. Firstly, if a word is slur-like, there need to exist (or have existed) oppressive racist 
practices. Secondly, there are and have been no such practices in Estonia. In section two I will 
outline four philosophical accounts of slurs: Hom’s (2008; 2010, 2012; Hom & May 2013, 
2018) truth-conditional account, Camp’s dual act view (2013; 2018), Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt’s 
(2018) discourse roles theory and Nunberg’s (2018) group affiliation theory. For each of the 
theories, I will show that the conditions of the socio-cultural context that necessarily must be 
fulfilled for a word to be considered a slur are indeed met by neeger and the Estonian context. 
Because of this, the cultural differences false friends argument will prove to be unsound. Based 
on this assessment, it cannot be shown that differences in the cultural context surreounding 
neeger and nigger amount to differences in meaning. 
 
At the end of section 2.1, I will consider the inappropriate theory counterargument according 
to which, there could be accounts of slurs that support false friends arguments – these have 
been simply omitted. I will then show that it does not succeed in proving my argumentation 
unsound because it leads one to conclude that there can be no Estonian slur-like words. 
Additionally, in 2.1.5, I will assess different data about the Estonian social context. 
 
Finally, I will summarise the conclusions of this Bachelor’s thesis. Additionally, I will consider 
three further research options. These include analysing dictionary practices, examining 





1. The false friends argument: preliminaries 
 
In this section I set up my defence of the thesis that the necessary conditions satisfied by nigger 
as a slur are also satisfied by neeger and the practices surrounding its use. In order to see why 
someone might claim otherwise, I will explain what is meant by calling one word a false friend 
of another. Secondly, I will outline two arguments – the linguistic authority and the cultural 
differences argument that share the conclusion that neeger is a false friend of nigger. This will 
provide a basis for assessing the soundness of the false friends arguments in section two. 
 
1.1 What are false friends 
 
In order to see what claiming that neeger is a false friend of nigger entails, I will briefly sketch 
out the concept of false friends.2 Two words are false friends iff they are very similar in form 
but their meanings diverge (Chaminzo-Dominguez & Nerlich, 2002). Similar in form means 
that two words are alike in terms of either pronunciation, grammar or both.3 The similarity in 
form is a necessary condition for classifying a word pairing as false friends.4 However, there 
are also cases where in addition to form, the two words also share some aspects in their 
meaning, these are semantic false friends. In my thesis, I am interested in cross-linguistic 
semantic false friends, i.e. the false friends relation between two words that are not in the same 
language and partly overlap in meaning. 
 
To make the idea clearer, I will present some Estonian-English examples of semantic false 
friends. Consider decade and dekaad, the English word means a period of ten years and the 
Estonian a period of ten days – both words signify a period of time and the period comprises 
ten units of time. Only the measures differ.5 Another example is lust (palatalised /s/ in Estonian, 
means ‘desire, fun’) and lust (‘strong sexual desire’ in English). 
 
                                                        
2 The term itself (faux amis in French) was coined by Maxime Koessler and Jules Derocquigny in 1928 
(Chaminzo-Dominguez, 2008). 
3 With cross-linguistic false friends, identical spelling and/or pronunciation is quite uncommon if the etymologies 
of the languages are different. This kind of categorisation allows me to group together homophones and 
homographs.  
4 Consider loud (/laʊd/) and laud, the first means 'making a lot of noise' and the second 'desk or table'. 
5 The belief that dekaad is a period of ten years seems to be “spreading like wildfire in the media” (Künstler, 
2018). Some example titles (Pullerits, 2016) include: “The dekaad of power of Toomas Hendrik Ilves”, “A 
dekaad of bone and joint diseases 2000-2010”, where the English decade has clearly rubbed off on the Estonian 
dekaad. 
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Based on the proposed definition and examples, if neeger and nigger were false friends, then 
that would mean that they carry the following features: they  a) are similar in form; b) are 
different in meaning; c) can but need not share some aspects of meaning. The definition of 
false friends does not require me to make condition (c) more specific. The proponents of false 
friends arguments in Estonia do not elaborate on whether they take neeger to have some 
characteristics besides similarity in form in common with nigger. However, they claim that the 
two words’ features diverge significantly when it comes to connotations and permissibility of 
use. I will therefore take the false friends arguments to claim that the central meaning of neeger 
and nigger differ, i.e. upon arguing that the argument is unsound, I will be claiming that it 
cannot be shown on the provided bases that their central meaning diverge. 
  
1.2 False friends arguments 
 
In this subsection I will present two ways people have argued for the claim that neeger and 
nigger are false friends. To avoid cluttering the presented arguments, I will eschew the implicit 
assumptions that neeger and nigger sound similar and are thus similar in form, and that nigger 
is derogatory and taboo (Hom 2008; Anderson & Lepore, 2013). Based on data from the media 
and linguistic corpora, it could be argued that meaning ambiguity exists. However, since the 
debates focus on the correct meaning (my emphasis) and none of the authors of the articles 
mention the possibility that there can be several correct meanings, throughout this thesis I will 
assume that Ots (2012), Pullerits (2013) and Priimägi (2013; Linnar…, 2017) believe neeger 
to only have one meaning.6 Because of the scope of this thesis, I will only touch upon the 
possible ambiguity in considering further research options. The first argument comes from a 
coordinator at the Centre of Practical Language Planning Egle Pullerits (2013, also based on 
Teder, 2013a).  
 
(1) Linguistic authority  
P1: All Estonian words are neutral by default, unless marked differently in ÕS. 
P2: No markers are added to neeger in the ÕS. 
C1: Neeger is neutral. (from P1 and P2) 
P3: If a word is neutral, then it is not derogatory. 
                                                        
6 All arguments were presented either in response to someone defending the claim that neeger is derogatory or in 
the context of establishing whether Estonian dictionary Õigekeelsussõnaraamat (ÕS) should take note of potential 
derision. 
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P4: Neeger is not derogatory. 
P5: If word A is derogatory and word B is not, A and B differ in meaning.  
C2: Neeger and nigger differ in meaning. (from P4-P5) 
P6: Two words A and B are false friends iff they are similar in form, yet different in 
meaning. 
C3: Neeger and nigger are false friends. (from C2, P6) 
 
The truth of P5 could be contended – arguably, some theories of word meaning would not say 
that the derogatory element contributes to meaning. However, this is not my primary concern 
upon outlining this argument because all proponents of false friends arguments implicitly 
assume that the two words are intrinsically dissimilar in other aspects besides the derogatory 
element too, they simply offer no explicit formulation of a defence of claims that would explain 
how they precisely differ.  
 
Although Pullerits’s argument does not explicitly state a conditional according to which for a 
word to be a slur, it must bear the relevant marker, it is implicitly assumed. That is because 
Pullerits takes whether a word’s neutrality to be determined by the dictionary, a slur-like word 
that is arguably non-neutral must also be marked as such. This linguistic practice and dictionary 
authority relationship can be understood in two ways. Firstly, dictionaries could be seen as 
descriptive documents of word usage. If that was the case, then it could be assumed that usage 
reflects word meaning but the dictionaries do not construct said meaning. Secondly, 
dictionaries might not only record meanings but also determine semantic facts. This would be 
the case if dictionaries were taken to be authorities in the community and social environment.7  
 
None of the examined philosophical accounts make dictionary practices relevant in 
determining slur-status and because of that, they cannot be used to defend the false friends 
arguments.8 It could be argued that even so, it might be the case that in Estonia, dictionaries 
actually are good guides to uses and that people do defer to them as authorities – and thus that 
at least in the Estonian context Pullerits’s argument succeeds. While an interesting way of 
reasoning, because of the scope of thesis, I will not further elaborate on this. This is because 
                                                        
7 For a defence of social externalism, according to which social institutions determine word meaning, see Burge 
(1979) and Burge (1986). 
8 Nunberg (2018) does elaborate on dictionary practices, yet uses them as an analogy – if a word bears a marker 
in the dictionary, the classification is similar to mentally categorising words. 
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my aim in this paper is to prove the unsoundness of the false friends arguments by showing 
that the necessary conditions satisfied by nigger are satisfied by neeger. Since none of the 
accounts takes a derogatory marker to be a necessary condition for nigger to be a slur, this 
discussion is secondary to my main goal in this paper. However, I will return to further examine 
the linguistic authority argument in the conclusion of the thesis. The second argument is the 
cultural differences argument. 
 
(2) Cultural differences  
P1: If a word for denoting a racial group is derogatory, then its users must be or must 
have been engaged in oppressive racist practices targeting the relevant racial group.9 
P2: The users of neeger are not or have not been engaged in such oppressive racist 
practices. 
C1: Neeger is not derogatory. (from P1 and P2) 
P3: If word A is derogatory and word B is not, then A and B differ in meaning.10 
C2: Neeger and nigger differ in meaning. (from C1 and P3) 
P4: Two words A and B are false friends iff they are similar in form, yet different in 
meaning. 
C3: Neeger and nigger are false friends. (from C2 and P4)11 
 
This is a combination of the arguments put forward by Ots (2012) and Priimägi (2013; 
Linnar…, 2017). I have merged the two together because they both claim that neeger does not 
bear a slur-like feature – either derogatoriness (Ots), or taboo-status (Priimägi) –, because of 
the lack of oppressive racist practices in Estonia.  
 
As previously outlined, this argument has two central premises – firstly, P1, according to which 
oppressive racist practices are necessary for considering a word derogatory and secondly, P2 – 
that these practices have not existed in Estonia. The false friends claim is thus that neeger is 
not the same kind of slur-like word as nigger because of the lack of oppressive racist practices.  
                                                        
9 Hereinafter, I have translated Estonian halvustav as derogatory. Personal correspondence with EKI has 
confirmed that this is an acceptable translation. 
10 See justification for P5 of the linguistic authority argument. 
11 Both authors explicitly appeal to the false friends argument. According to Ots (2012), the similarity between 
neeger and nigger is similar to that of vakk and fuck or prikk and prick, if people took offense upon hearing 
someone say the neutral Estonian nouns, then it would simply be a mistake. Priimägi claims (2013, p. 51) that the 
OK gesture is insulting in Southern France and it would be a mistake to think it is positive – supposedly something 
similar is happening with neeger and nigger. 
 
 9 
Upon assessing the truth of both of these premises, the nature of oppressive racist practices 
should be examined. According to Ots (2012), Estonians ”have had no fights or quarrels” with 
black people, so there is no reason for the two groups to use derogatory language to address 
each other. According to Priimägi (2013, p. 51), people in the U.S have refrained from using 
nigger “because of the collective guilt of white people in America for their engagement in 
racism and slavery”. Based on this, it seems that the differences between Estonia and the U.S 
stem from historically trackable conflicts between the targeted group and the speaker group.  
 
In the first section I have explained what the false friends status means and shown two different 
ways people have argued for neeger not being derogatory or taboo. It is important to note that 
if one accepts that these false friends arguments are sound, then conclusions about neeger being 
permissible to use and not being derogatory commit proponents of these views to implicit 
assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of slur-like words. That is because they 
assume a kind of theory according to which certain social context and dictionary practices are 
necessary for a word to be slur-like, however, the Estonian context and practices do not satisfy 
these criteria. In the next section, I will focus on making explicit the conditions proponents of 
the cultural differences argument assume and assess whether these criteria align with 
















2. Assessing the false friends arguments 
 
In what follows, accounts of slurs are discussed to assess the false friends arguments. Slur is a 
piece of metalanguage that differs from words like derogatory or pejorative. In Estonian, there 
is no precise translation of slur. A possible equivalent would be vaenunimi (roughly meaning 
hate name) (Laineste, 2008), however, few people acknowledge this neologism. Because the 
category of Estonian slurs has never been established, there are also no “paradigmatic” cases 
to compare neeger against.13 However, that does not mean that there are no slurs in Estonian. 
In this thesis, I claim that the false friends arguments presented in section one are unsound 
because it is not the case that the necessary conditions for a word to be a slur are satisfied by 
nigger and not satisfied by neeger – the Estonian word also meets these conditions, making it 
impossible to prove on these bases that it is not the same kind of word as nigger.  
 
In this section, I will be using philosophical accounts of slurs to defend this claim. As 
mentioned in section one, both false friends arguments include two crucial conditions: a 
conditional about a necessary condition neeger would have to fulfil to be a slur-like word and 
the claim that the consequent of the conditional is false. Based on that, the philosophical 
theories are used for two reasons: firstly, to see, if the condition postulated by the Estonian 
accounts is relevant and necessary for an anglophone word to be considered a slur and 
secondly, to assess, if it is really the case that neeger fails to satisfy this criterion. 
 
2.1 Appealing to cultural differences 
 
In this subsection, I will be assessing the cultural differences argument. I will begin by 
outlining the crux of the argument. I will then examine four accounts of anglophone slurs to 
figure out which of them also put focus on the socio-cultural context. This will help me 
establish whether the conditions necessary for a word to be a slur-like according to the 
proponents of false friends arguments can really be considered criteria for attributing words 
slur-status.  
 
According to the cultural differences argument (Ots, 2012; Priimägi, 2013; Linnar…, 2017), 
neeger is a false friend of nigger because there are important differences between the meanings 
                                                        
13 Languages can contain slur-like words without them being explicitly dubbed slurs, e.g. Italian philosophers 
have published papers titled “Slurs: Un’introduzione” (Bianchi, 2013), which indicates that there is no precise 
word in Italian that corresponds to slur in English but that the topic is still relevant. 
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of the two words – while nigger is derogatory, neeger is not. This difference supposedly arises 
from the Estonian cultural context differing from that of anglophone countries, proponents of 
the argument believe that oppressive racist practices exist in the latter but not in the former. 
Out of the considered theories, only the views that make the existence of racist practices 
necessary for a word to be a slur could possibly help support the false friends arguments. These 
are: the truth-conditional account (Hom 2008; 2010; 2012, Hom & May 2013;  2018), 
perspectival account (Camp 2013, 2018), the discourse roles account (Popa-Wyatt & Wyatt, 
2018) and the group affiliation account (Nunberg, 2018).14  
 
2.1.1 Hom's truth-conditional account 
 
For every account of slurs listed in section two, I will be using a three-step strategy for 
assessing the cultural differences argument. Firstly, I will provide an overview of the relevant 
philosophical account; secondly, I will show that it implies that the existence of oppressive 
practices is a necessary condition for a word to be a slur, i.e. that only if there are such practices, 
can there be a thick externalist meaning attributed to slurs. Finally, I will show that this 
necessary condition is satisfied by the Estonian context. In order to present all data points 
describing the Estonian context succinctly together, I will first present all the theories and then 
turn to the third step of the strategy, namely the assessment of whether the conditions upon the 
social context are satisfied in Estonia. In 2.1.5, I will show that the proponents of the false 
friends arguments who assume that neeger is not the same kind of slur-like word as nigger 
because it does not satisfy the necessary conditions nigger does, are mistaken. That is, the 
cultural differences between Estonia and the U.S should not lead one to conclude that there are 
differences in meaning or that neeger is a false friend of nigger.  
 
                                                        
14 Omitted theories include the presupposition, conventional implicature (CI) and prohibition account. A 
presupposition is an implicit assumption – while asserting P, the speaker is also entering something else, 
presupposition Q, to the conversational background (Stalnaker, 1974). A CI is the object of the act of implying 
something beyond literal word meaning in virtue of the conventional meaning of the words (Grice, 1991). The 
first two accounts claim that slurs refer to group membership and contribute either a presupposition or CI that 
communicates a negative attitude (Potts, 2005). I have omitted these accounts for two reasons. Firstly, both views 
claim that contribution of negative content depends on word meaning and its development, rather than oppression 
relations. Secondly, neither of the views establishes a causal chain underlying a word becoming a slur. Since 
proponents of the cultural differences argument only address the social setting of the speaker group and the 
targeted group which supposedly causally give rise to slur-status, these accounts cannot be used to support the 
argument. Finally, according to the prohibitionist view (Anderson & Lepore, 2013), slurs are inherently 
derogatory and should be prohibited in all contexts.This prohibition arises from the judgement of the targeted 
group of people who become targeted through historical processes. However, it is not in the scope of this thesis 
to delineate all ways these processes could operate. 
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I will begin with Hom’s truth-conditional account (TCA). According to TCA, slurs express 
complex socially constructed properties that are part of the word's truth-conditional content 
(Hom, 2010, p. 180).15 Upon someone using a slur, they are saying that the person referred to 
“ought be subject to p*1 + ... + p*n because of being d*1 + ... + d*n all because of being npc*.” 
(ibid.) Npc* signifies the targeted group of people;  p*1 + ... + p*n are prescriptions about how 
people should treat members of  npc*; d*1 + ... + d*n are stereotypic negative characteristics 
applied to members of the npc* in virtue of them being members of npc*. So if A is called a 
nigger, then what is said is something like A ought to be subject to exclusion from advancement 
on the career ladder and higher school admission conditions and …, because of being lazy, 
stupid and worthless …, all because of being black. While npc* is a biological characteristic 
of the group, characteristics d*1 + ... + d*n as well as norms p*1 + ... + p*n are determined by 
social conventions, beliefs and practices of the speaker group (ibid., p. 16). According to Hom 
and May (2013; 2018), the extension of a slur, e.g. nigger, is always an empty set, i.e. there are 
no people who deserve to be attributed  d*1 + ... + d*n and held to standards p*1 + ... + 
p*n  because of their group membership.  
 
To see what is required of the social context surrounding slurs, I will expand on what it means 
for Hom’s externalist meaning to be socially constructed. According to Hom (2008, 2010, 
2012), characteristics d*1 + ... + d*n and standards p*1 + ... + p*n arise from social institutions 
of racism (Hom, 2008, p. 17). Social institutions of racism comprise two elements: an ideology 
and a set of practices (ibid.). An ideology is a set of beliefs that ascribes negative characteristics 
to the targeted group (ibid.). These beliefs entail that npc* are d*1 + ... + d*n; in case of black 
people, the beliefs that they are stupid, lazy or violent. The set of practices include committing 
and promoting discriminatory acts against the people in npc*. Hom (ibid.) claims that cases of 
racist treatment of black people can range from impolite language to extreme physical violence.  
 
To reiterate, for there to be a slur (in this thick externalist sense) there must exist a racist 
ideology and racist practices due to which characteristics d*1 + ... + d*n and standards p*1 + ... 
                                                        
15 In some of Hom's papers, slur words are referred to as pejoratives. According to Hom & May (2013, p. 293), 
slurring is the act of using a specific kind of pejorative linguistic expression. However, examples of slurs and 
pejoratives reveal that they overlap. As the category of pejoratives is wider than the category of slurs, including, 
e.g. also curse words (Hom, 2010), I will only use slur words to keep the terminology consistent. This move is 
justified because the initial proposal of Hom (2008) extended to racial slurs and the theory was later expanded to 
account for other types of pejoratives. 
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+ p*n  are attributed to group npc* - only the existence of such institution can explain why 
words like nigger continue to be used.16  
 
The following line of reasoning could be used to counter this necessary condition: it could be 
argued that there has never been a social institution that is justified in attributing d*1 + ... + d*n 
and p*1 + ... + p*n to group npc*. The first counterargument would hurt my case if TCA 
required the social institution’s existence to be morally right, however, it does not – the 
institution need not have a valid reason for the existence of negative beliefs and practices about 
npc*, TCA explains, rather than justifies the situation in which slurs are used. This is 
highlighted by the fact that Hom & May (2013) clearly state that the extension of nigger is an 
empty set. To return to the necessary condition according to which there has to exist a social 
institution for a word to be considered a slur, we could not imagine a situation where there is 
no such institution, i.e. no racist practices or ideology, but still a slur that fits the description 
put forward by TCA exists.  
 
If proponents of TCA claim that for a word to be considered a slur, there must have existed 
racist practices or ideologies, then this seems to align with what the cultural differences 
argument (P1) takes to be a necessary condition for attributing a word slur status. In order to 
prove the argument to still be unsound, I will show that these beliefs and practices also exist in 
Estonia in subsection 2.1.5, i.e. that neeger cannot be dismissed as non-derogatory because the 
consequent of this conditional is false (i.e. that P2 is false). To sum up this subsection, it could 
be said that the necessary condition for a word to be considered a slur is that there is a social 
institution of racism that creates and upholds derogatory practices and beliefs. The necessity 
for this institution can be divided into two conditions: 
 
1a) For a word to be a slur, the speaker group must have negative beliefs about the 
targets. 
                                                        
16 To make the TCA analysis clearer, consider this parallel case. In Estonia, the age of majority is 18. The precise 
point when kids cease to be underage is determined by a social institution. People under 18 have the characteristics 
of not being able to vote in parliamentary elections, consume alcohol, etc. They are all obliged to complete basic 
school, they need parental consent in deciding legal matters, etc. all because of being underage. Underage picks 
out a certain group of people with specific features who are perceived in a certain way because of the social 
institution that regulates their rights. This analysis is similar to a TCA view of slurs but there is one major 
difference. In case of slurs, as opposed to underage, there is no one who actually falls in the category of npc*, i.e. 
the target group. 
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1b) For a word to be a slur, the speaker group must engage in discriminatory practices 
against the targets. 
 
2.1.2 Camp's perspectival account 
 
In this subsection I will continue to apply the previously outlined strategy, that is, I will explain 
the main theses of Elizabeth Camp's dual act view (2013; 2018), outline the ways in which 
cultural differences are relevant to a word being considered a slur and what characteristics a 
social context must satisfy for a word to be a slur. Camp’s theory can be interpreted in several 
ways and I will provide a reading that allows the English nigger to be classified as a slur. I will 
then show in 2.1.5 that Estonian neeger would satisfy the same conditions as nigger, i.e. that it 
cannot be considered a false friend because of differences in the surrounding social context. 
 
A central term in Camp’s account is a perspective. Camp (2013, 2018) describes a perspective 
as an intuitive way of perceiving something. A perspective (Camp, 2013, p. 335) is not a 
feeling, it is something that gives rise to feelings. Here is an example: in French one might opt 
to refer to someone with tu or vous. If the latter word is used, then the speaker signals allegiance 
to a perspective according to which the person referred to is perceived as superior, elder or 
higher in status. This kind of honorary perspective might elicit emotions like deference and 
respect.17 
 
A slurring perspective comprises two characteristics, firstly, some features stand out and are 
more salient than others. Secondly, some features are more central and important than others 
(Camp, 2013, p. 336).18 The hypothesis Camp sets up is that upon using a slur, a slurring 
perspective is activated. That is, firstly, a lot of attention is attributed to group membership (g) 
and secondly, it becomes an integral part about Gs (the group of people in question) in the 
speaker's mind. Belonging to this group is believed to explain several features of Gs and 
determine the essence of Gs. In some cases, the set of characteristics common to all Gs in virtue 
of g constitutes a stereotype. When A says, “Niggers never show up on time,” they not only 
find it necessary to make race a salient feature of the group of people, they also make it central 
                                                        
17 Perspectives might entail a larger set of phenomena perceived in a specific way, there could be scientific and 
political perspectives (Camp 2013, p. 337). 
18 This connection might seem intuitive but there are cases where a characteristic is salient, yet not central, e.g. 




to their identity and attribute negative characteristics to these people because of (my emphasis) 
their group membership. Depending on the context of the utterance, there are two types of 
possible speech acts – in case of one, group membership is at issue, in case of the other only a 
slurring perspective is.19  
 
Before turning to describing what would have to obtain for a slurring perspective to be created, 
I will briefly return to TCA, the account described in 2.1.1, to clearly contrast Camp’s 
perspectival account with it. TCA took the existence of a social institution comprising an 
ideology and racist practices to be necessary for a word to be a slur.  At first glance, the 
perspectival account might seem similar, since it also claims that the speakers must have 
negative attitudes about the target group. However, for Camp, the mere existence of such 
beliefs is not enough, the beliefs must be a certain kind and arise because of a certain 
mechanism different from Hom’s thick externalist explanation. When TCA required the social 
institutions to essentially create the categories which bear specific features, hold targets to 
specific standards all because of belonging to the target group, Camp requires the speakers to 
perceive the targets in a certain way.  
 
This ‘certain way’ must be formalized into a necessary condition that would allow me to assess 
slur status. Taking into account that when people use slurs, the targets’ group membership is 
made salient and central, the condition could be worded as follows: for a word to be a slur, its 
use must signal that only membership of a particular group is salient and central about the 
targeted. This description, however, is not strict enough, since non-slurs might also qualify as 
such.20 For example, consider the aforementioned example of tu and vous. Upon using vous, it 
is also signaled that membership of some kind of social group superior to the speaker is salient, 
however, the description offers no explanatory power as to what this saliency amounts to. 
Because of this, the nature of the activated perspective must be refined, i.e. it must be explained 
what it really perceiving group membership as solely salient and central implies.  
 
                                                        
19 The speech act distinction arises because of slurring perspectives and does not constitute a necessary condition 
for a word to be a slur, so I will not elaborate on this aspect of Camp’s view. For a more thorough description of 
the dual acts view, see Camp (2018). 
20 The aim of my thesis is to assess neeger, a word whose meaning is constantly debated, based on these conditions. 
If the necessary conditions are worded such that it is not obvious that only slurs meet them, my argument is 
weaker. 
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Camp makes explicit two kinds of beliefs that are tied to slurring perspectives – firstly, they 
distance and secondly, they derogate. The first condition entails that Gs, the group of people 
referred to by a slur, are considered others, the outgroup, compared to the people that use slurs 
to refer to Gs. The second characteristic can be interpreted following the definition I provided 
in section 1. The users express their contempt of the target in general, derision arises because 
of prevalent negative beliefs or attitudes according to which Gs are worthy of contempt in 
virtue of being Gs. Adding these two characteristics, the necessary condition could thus be 
worded in the following way: for a word to be a slur, its use must signal that membership of a 
group different than the speaker group is salient and central about the targeted and because of 
this, they are worthy of derogation. Implicit in this condition is that the use of a slur and 
communication of a slurring perspective is to be understood in a social context, i.e. that it is a 
pointed choice to use the word. 
  
This formulation of the necessary conditions might still not seem demanding enough. A 
proponent of a competing account could say that this description does not sufficiently sketch 
out a view that correctly predicts slur status. While this objection deserves consideration, it 
does not undermine my claim about the false friends arguments being unsound. Here are to 
reasons for believing this. Firstly, since the variety of slurs the perspectival view aims to 
account for is very wide, the necessary conditions cannot be too limiting.21 Combined with the 
general mechanism of perspectives, i.e. that group membership is attributed special attention, 
the existence of distancing and derogating beliefs can be taken to be necessary and sufficient. 
Secondly, even if one managed to show that these two conditions are not sufficient for a word 
to be considered a slur, they can be used to show that if they do indeed obtain in case of nigger. 
The crux of my argument is that all necessary conditions satisfied by nigger are satisfied by 
neeger. This claim in unambitious in the sense that it is only stating that it cannot be proven 
that neeger is not the same kind of word as nigger, it says nothing about similarities to or 
differences between other slurs and neeger.22 
 
                                                        
21 She uses examples of racial slurs, ethnic slurs, gender slurs and slurs targeting people of different sexual 
orientation in Camp (2013) and Camp (2018). 
22 If I had claimed that neeger must sufficiently fulfil all characteristics of slurs, then the criticism might have 
been damaging. 
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To sum up this subsection, it can be said that for a word to be a slur, it must evoke a slurring 
perspective, i.e. an outlook on the targeted group that makes their skin colour salient and 
central. The necessary condition for a perspective to arise can thus be sketched out as follows:  
 
2) For a word to be a slur, its use must signal that membership of a group different than 
the speaker group is salient and central about the targeted and because of this, they are 
worthy of derogation. 
 
2.1.3 Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt's discourse roles account 
 
In this subsection, I will describe an account of slurs put forward by Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 
(2018) whose theory focuses on offense variation across utterances of slurs. I will then outline 
three necessary conditions social contexts must fulfil for a word to be a slur under this account. 
Oppression in Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) is taken to be the extent to which person A can 
unjustly affect person B contrary to B's interests (Lukes, 1974, p. 30). Two other terms that 
frame the discussion are social roles and discourse roles. Social roles are social constructs that 
are tied to status rights, responsibilities and information about permissible behaviours (Popa-
Wyatt & Wyatt, 2018, p. 2888). Discourses are defined as individual social interactions and 
based on that, discourse roles are considered to be short-term social roles that exist for the 
purpose of a particular dialogue (ibid.). The crux of the view is that slurs oppress via discourse 
role assignment (Popa-Wyatt & Wyatt, 2018, p. 2881) which are attributed to speakers because 
of their specific social role as a black person.  
 
The first condition addresses the saliency of social roles in discourses. A given social role 
becomes salient if the relevant social group has been systematically oppressed. We can imagine 
situations where the situation surrounding the discourse does justify prioritising one social role. 
For example, if someone with the social roles of a student and a waitress discusses the 
requirements of their assignment with a professor, then their social role of being a student is 
salient; several norms govern this discourse, e.g. she should use formal language when talking 
to the professor. This role is salient because the interaction is taking place at a school, the 
student has just finished a lecture. There are parallel slurring uses where it is not the discourse 
that justifies prioritization of skin colour but the historically oppressive practices that give rise 
to saliency. Imagine two bigots and a black man waiting for their appointments at the doctor's 
office, let's also assume that the black man is wearing a hoodie that states the name of his 
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university on it. One bigot whispers to the other, “I’m in the line after the nigger”.23 The claim 
Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt make is that bigots always take the black person's social role as a black 
person rather than someone who is ill, a man, a son, or a university student to be salient.24 
 
Here the specific interaction plays no role in determining saliency, i.e. while it is common for 
young people at schools to be associated with student status, it is not common for men at 
hospitals to be automatically associated with the social role of being black. Because this role 
becomes central, a discourse role that disparages is also created – assuming that those who tend 
to perceive black people through a “racial prism”, i.e. attribute more attention to their 
blackness, also associate negative features with this characteristic. So based on this discussion, 
the first condition that has to be satisfied by the social context for a word to be considered a 
slur is that the targeted group’s social role as the targeted group must become salient in 
everyday discourses because of using the slur.  
 
However, it is not the case that saliency of that social role only affects how the targeted are 
perceived, the attribution of a discourse role also oppresses by letting them know that they are 
inferior and worthy of condemnation. This is also what distinguishes the discourse roles view 
from Camp’s account – Camp proposes an explanation of the mechanism of slurs, they elicit 
slurring perspectives, but what perceiving people via perspectives does to the perceived is of 
lesser importance for her. It is important to note that in case of slurring, these roles are assigned 
merely in virtue of the person’s skin colour. It could, of course, be the case that a black person 
has committed a crime and does deserve to be condemned, however, slurring is not tied to any 
particular act or behaviour of the target. 
 
The second condition addresses the effects slur uses have. In addition to discourse roles 
oppressing, they also influence the way audience members treat the target group in the future, 
i.e. they contribute to wider social roles (Popa-Wyatt & Wyatt, p. 2896-2898). This implies 
that not only do social roles give rise to discourse roles, the connection works the other way 
around too, making racist practices a vicious circle. For example, it might be the case that if 
                                                        
23  Slurs also attribute discourse roles to non-participants (Popa-Wyatt & Wyatt, 2018, p. 2892). Even if the person 
that is targeted with a slur is not present, the role extends to them. For example, if A says to B that C is a nigger 
and that people should be careful around him, it changes the way B interprets any further mentions of C. If C 
were to enter the conversation after that, then he would already bear a discourse role.  
24 Arguably, what constitutes the social role of a black person can be understood differently. However, in this 
context and following Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt, this role entails something historical oppression. As argued in 2.1.5, 
in Estonia, this social role seems to be an outgroup role.  
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the bigot shows others the power they can acquire as well as the emotional and physical harm 
they can cause, those who share a similar mindset begin to believe that these attitudes are 
acceptable. Slurring and attribution of subordinate discourse roles might also affect the targeted 
group via the perlocutionary effects the utterances have – the member of the targeted group 
might by verbally abused or physically assaulted (ibid., p. 2897). The second necessary 
condition of a word to be considered a slur would thus be that the discourse role attributed to 
the audience via slurring perpetuates the oppressive social role.  
 
Finally, Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt propose one characteristic of slurs that sets this account apart 
from other theories, including Camp’s with which the discourse roles view shares several 
characteristics. According to the authors, “there can be no offence” and no slur-status in case 
of words like limey, yankee and honky (ibid., p. 2899) because they refer to groups of people 
who have historically been the oppressors, rather than the oppressed. This implies that for a 
word to be considered a slur, the targeted group must necessarily be the oppressed, and cannot 
have been the oppressors.  
 
In this subsection, I have examined the discourse roles theory put forward by Popa-Wyatt and 
Wyatt (2018). The account postulates a necessary connection between the social practices and 
a word’s slur-status, the three conditions could be delineated as:  
 
(3a) For a word to be a slur, the targets’ social role as the target must become salient in 
everyday discourses. 
(3b) For a word to be a slur, the targets must be the oppressed and the speakers the 
oppressors. 
(3c) For a word to be a slur, the slurring discourse role must perpetuate the oppressive 
social role. 
 
In 2.1.5 I will show that even if the the cultural differences argument is justified in assuming 
that certain features of the social context must obtain for a word to be considered a slur (P1 
holds), these conditions are equally satisfied by neeger and nigger. I will argue that in case 
nigger meets the condition (P2 is false), i.e. if the theory is suitable to account for slurs, then 
neeger meets it too. 
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2.1.4 Nunberg's group affiliation account 
 
In this subsection, I will continue with the previous strategy – I will put forward the crux of 
theory, namely that upon slurring, people signal allegiance to a negative view about the targeted 
group that diverges from the beliefs of most people. Secondly, I will show that all the theory 
considers necessary for a word to be a slur is that there are two groups, those who use a neutral 
word and the slurrers. I will delineate five necessary conditions for a word to be a slur under 
this account.  
 
Nunberg’s (2018) account of slurs focuses on the utterers of slurs, rather than the targeted 
group. A central term in Nunberg’s view is that of ventriloquistic implicatures. These 
implicatures appear when Grice's Maxim of Manner is flouted, i.e. the speaker fails to avoid 
obscurity and ambiguity (Grice 1991, p. 28), and refers to someone with a marked, rather than 
default word. By choosing to refer to A via conventions of a social group, group B, other than 
the social group whose norms define the default way of referring to A, group G, the speaker 
implicates affiliation with a particular social group B (Nunberg 2018, p. 38). Here is an 
example: by X choosing to refer to black people with nigger, the conventions of a bigoted 
social group B who belittles black people are being alluded to, rather than the conventions of 
the general public G who would refer to the targets by using black. X thus signals their 
allegiance to group B. The essence of Nunberg’s view is that by using a slur, a type of 
implicature is made that can only arise in a certain social context. I will now continue to 
describe this social context by explaining the nature of group B and group G as well as their 
relationship. 
 
According to Nunberg (2018, p. 35), group B is a community of speakers who have a specific 
name for a group of people – this diverges from their default name. Group B’s attitudes toward 
the targeted shape the conventions that govern their social interactions (ibid., p. 38). In 
addition, these conventions stem from members of group B having a conscious interest in using 
a specific non-default version of a word. So there must be a specific word (a), a negative 
attitude (b) and a conscious motivation to use the specific word (c). The consciousness-aspect 
entails members of B being aware of their beliefs (ibid., p. 52) and sensing a difference between 
their non-default word and the word used by group G.  
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I will illustrate the nature of group B with the example of nigger. Firstly, there is a group of 
people – bigots, who use nigger. Secondly, they view blacks with contempt, i.e. feel negative 
attitudes towards black people (b). Thirdly, negative attitudes and the feeling of superiority 
motivate (c) the use of a specific word, nigger, (a) to distinguish group B from members of the 
general public who do not feel the same sort of way about black people. Group B consciously 
acknowledges the pointed choice of utilizing nigger instead of black. 
 
Group G is a group who uses a “nonslurring lexicalised default” (ibid., p. 40), which 
presupposes the existence of a neutral counterpart word as a necessary condition for a word to 
be considered a slur. The social norms governing interactions in group G dictate that it is 
expected of members to use the default word for referring to someone. So in case of black 
people, group G would refer to them simply by using something like black because this is 
dictated by the rules the social interactions in group G follow – referring to black people by 
some other, non-default word would signal allegiance with some other group.  
 
It could be thus said that the social context that needs to obtain for a word to be a slur simply 
needs to include a group B and a group G. However, this is not enough: consider an example 
where A and her boyfriend B absolutely hate their neighbour's dog because it keeps barking 
throughout the night (b). Because neither A nor B can sleep due to this, they feel angry and 
want to actively convey their contempt of the dog (c), which is why they decide to start 
referring to it as a cur (a).25 Cur, however, is not a slur. To avoid classifying non-slurs as slurs, 
Nunberg introduces an additional condition – the social category that is being referred to either 
with the non-default (group B) or default word (group G) must be one that is “socially disputed” 
(Nunberg 2018, p. 46). This means that there must disagreement in the society about this group, 
and this conflict of opinion must be represented in the divergent opinions of people in group B 
and group G. To sum up this subsection, I have shown that postulating the existence of groups 
B and G entails a set of necessary conditions that must be fulfilled for a word to be considered 
a slur. These include:  
 
(4a) For a word to be a slur, it must be used by a group whose views diverge from the 
general majority. 
                                                        
25  Cur is borrowed from Frege (1980). 
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(4b) For a word to be a slur, it must convey the negative attitude of the dissenting group 
toward the targeted. 
(4c) For a word to be a slur, the people using it must consciously motivated to choose 
the word. 
(4d) For a word to be a slur, there must be a neutral alternative for referring to the target 
group. 
(4e) For a word to be a slur, the target group must be socially disputed. 
 
In the following subsection I will show that it is not the case that the necessary conditions 
satisfied by nigger are not satisfied by neeger by providing evidence that even if the conditional 
postulating a connection between social context and slur-status stands (P1), the relevant social 
context is indeed in place in Estonia (P2 is false). 
 
2.1.5 Describing the Estonian social context 
 
In the previous sections, I have outlined the relevant features of four philosophical accounts. 
This examination has shown that all of them consider social context to be important in 
determining slur status. However, I claim that the necessary conditions satisfied by nigger are 
also satisfied by neeger and provide proof for this claim by describing the Estonian social 
context. This will show that the conditions proponents of the cultural differences argument 
appeal to (P2), are false. 
 
In my description of the cultural context, I will be using empirical data in the media, in 
linguistic corpora, digitalised archives as well as demographic studies.26 Of course, this will 
only account for a portion of people who have publicly expressed their attitudes, however, if 
these data are compared to those of anglophone countries, meaningful parallels can still be 
drawn – in order for the cultural differences argument to be proven to be unsound, it would 
have to be the case that the Estonian context satisfies the same criteria as the anglophone. I 
argue that this is true and because of that, there are no differences in the surrounding practices 
that could lead to a difference in meaning and attribution of false friend status. Here are the 
necessary conditions of each account once again.  
 
                                                        
26 I searched for the keyword neeger and then followed up the query by checking if the words have actually been 
used or if they are simply mentioned to make a metalinguistic point. 
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(1a) For a word to be a slur, the speaker group must have negative beliefs about the targets.  
(1b) For a word to be a slur, the speaker group must engage in discriminatory practices against the targets.  
(2) For a word to be a slur, its use must signal that membership of a group different than the speaker 
group is salient and central about the targeted and because of this, they are worthy of derogation. 
(3a) For a word to be a slur, the targets’ social role as the target must become salient in everyday 
discourses.  
(3b) For a word to be a slur, the targets must be the oppressed and the speakers the oppressors. 
(3c) For a word to be a slur, the slurring discourse role must perpetuate the oppressive social role. 
(4a) For a word to be a slur, it must be used by a group whose views diverge from the general majority.  
(4b) For a word to be a slur, it must convey the negative attitude of the dissenting group toward the 
targeted. 
(4c) For a word to be a slur, the people using it must consciously motivated to choose the word.  
(4d) For a word to be a slur, there must be a neutral alternative for referring to the target group.  
(4e) For a word to be a slur, the target group must be socially disputed. 
 
I will divide these conditions into three groups. The first group comprises (1a), (2), (3a), (4a) 
and (4e). This set of conditions addresses beliefs have about black people. To show that these 
conditions are really fulfilled, the following evidence must be provided: there has to be a group 
of people who distances themselves from blacks and has negative beliefs about them. These 
beliefs include considering black people being black central to their identity and seeing their 
skin colour as reason to find them worthy of contempt. The nature of blacks must be socially 
disputed, i.e. it must not be the case that everyone in Estonia holds these kinds of negative 
beliefs. 
 
The second group comprises (1b), (3b) and (3c) and addresses the supposedly racist practices 
in Estonia. In order for these criteria to be fulfilled, it needs to be the case that Estonians have 
verbally or physically abused blacks, that there is a power dynamic where the speakers are the 
oppressors and the targeted the oppressed and that uses of neeger perpetuate racist practices in 
virtue of this power dynamic. 
 
Finally, the third set of conditions comprises (4b), (4c) and (4d) which all address 
characteristics of specific words and their use, rather than the underlying beliefs of social 
groups. For these conditions to obtain, it must be the case that neeger is used hatefully, that 
there is an alternative that could be used in place of neeger and that it is a conscious choice to 
opt for neeger. 
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I will now go through all three sets of conditions and provide evidence for the satisfaction of 
each criterion. Firstly, I will address the existence of negative beliefs about blacks in Estonia. 
One group that openly expresses allegiance to these beliefs comprises conservative nationalists 
and followers of the EKRE party. For a long time, the party’s immigration policy slogan was 
“Kui on must, näita ust” (If they’re black, show them the door) (Teder, 2013b) and similar 
attitudes are prevalent among party leaders and followers alike. For example, Mart Helme 
(Mihkels, 2018), the head of the EKRE party has said that, “If one were to knock on a black 
person's head, the sound would be hollow,” alluding to one of the aforementioned stereotypes 
about black people being stupid. Another example of members of the EKRE party conveying 
their negative attitudes toward black people comes from Jaak Madison (Madison…, 2015) who 
claims that in order for black soldiers in the allied forces to avoid getting insulted on the streets, 
they should wear their uniforms even outside the military base.  
 
An obvious objection to these examples is that they are expressed only by a select group of 
people and it is not clear that the number of people who hold the described negative beliefs is 
sufficient. I will respond to this claim in three parts. Firstly, it is not the case in anglophone 
countries either that a majority of people agree with racist views. Since my argument is based 
on proving that there really is no dissimilarity that could lead to difference in meaning, then 
what is relevant is whether there does exist such a group in Estonia and in the U.S. Secondly, 
if one wanted to prove the prevalence of such attitudes, the 2019 parliamentary elections could 
be highlighted – the EKRE party secured nearly 100 000 votes (18%) (Hääletamis- ja 
valimistulemus, 2019).27 Thirdly, survey company Saar Poll has researched how Estonians 
perceive foreigners and results can shed light on some general attitudes. One of the questions 
was about how Estonians would feel if their new neighbours were black – while only 6% of 
people said they would be for it, 68% of respondents claimed, they would be against this 
(Rahvussuhted Eestis, 2016). People were asked about a hypothetical situation and thus could 
only base their judgment on limited personal experience or stereotypes. It can be assumed it 
was primarily the skin colour of the hypothetical neighbours that made the respondents reply 
the way they did.  
 
                                                        
27 As a comparison, the right-wing UK Independence Party has only managed to win seats in the House of 
Commons once since 1997 – in 2015 they won 12% of the vote (Osborn, Clarke, Franklin & Straumann, 2015). 
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The second set of criteria can be shown to apply by providing examples of discriminatory 
practices in Estonia. To begin with, several black Estonians have cited cases of verbal abuse 
where they are told to “crawl back to Africa” or to “get the hell out of Estonia” (Paju, 2018; 
Mustanahaline..., 2015). Additionally, there are cases of physical abuse. For example, Carl 
Tuulik, a black Estonian has described an instance where he was attacked in the street (ibid.). 
A very recent case from March 2019 also proves this point: a black person was kicked and 
shoved in Tartu for no other reason than being black – no conversation between the assaulted 
party and the assailant took place (Palmiste, 2019). An especially vivid case is described by 
singer Ranae Rain (Soome…, 2019): while on the tram, a stranger had sat opposite her, taken 
a bullet out of their pocket, shown it to her and said it was meant for her. These behaviours can 
be taken to reflect a feeling of superiority. The practices combined with beliefs outlined in the 
previous paragraph seem to uphold each other and prompt further discrimination. First example 
of this comes from supporters of EKRE, once again. When neeger is used in Uued Uudised, 
people subscribing to this worldview also get the sense that it is okay to use neeger. For 
example, an anonymous commenter left the following remark on an article about racist 
attitudes in Estonia, “They [authors of the article] and their gays and neegrid should die or go 
to Canada and form their own parliament there.” (comments on 5Miinust... 2019). This 
example is significant because it was EKRE who told people to emigrate to Canada if they 
were not content with EKRE’s vision of Estonia, thus making the commentator's allegiance 
with the party quite apparent. A second example of these types of beliefs’ effect on racist 
practices comes from police lieutenant Maarja Punak according to whom the number of racist 
speech and public hatred has increased in recent months (Nemsitsveridze, 2019). This can be 
tied to the increased prevalence of public condemnation of blacks and immigrants.28 
 
This cluster of examples could be objected to by saying that it is not obvious that Estonians 
have historically been the oppressors and blacks the oppressed. This claim originates from 
Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) according to whom this historical oppressor-oppressed 
relationship is required for the oppressive discourse roles to arise. Therefore, this objection is 
defended by appealing to the claim that there would be no basis for a specific social role to 
become salient in the discourse and for this saliency to amount to a negative assessment of the 
target if there has been no such historical imbalance. My reply to this counterargument includes 
                                                        
28 Besides the change in political power, it does not seem like any other objective factors have influenced 
Estonians’ opinions, i.e. there has not been an influx of immigrants or crimes committed by immigrants, etc. 
which could prompt a change in attitudes and practices.  
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relating the discussion back to my central thesis – it is not my aim to show that neeger is a slur, 
I am arguing that the discussed necessary conditions do not provide a basis for establishing a 
difference between nigger and neeger. Since the condition is accepted in the case of English 
slurs and nigger, even if it does not predict words like honky and limey to be slurs, then it can 
be accepted in the Estonian context on the same basis too. However, a more meaningful 
argument could be made for the claim that such oppressor-oppressed dichotomy does exist. In 
both Estonia and the U.S, the speaker group, white people, have never been oppressed by blacks 
so the relation between the groups is a similar kind. Additionally, although there is no such 
legislation in place, there are no laws to defend black people from racist hate speech, either, 
and the prevalence of negative attitudes in history is also telling.29  
 
The third and final set of conditions addressed the actual usage of neeger. I claim that data 
shows that there exists a neutral alternative to neeger, that is mustanahaline. Proof for its 
neutrality is twofold. Firstly, black Estonians prefer mustanahaline (e.g. Paju, 2018). Secondly, 
databases like Linguee and Glosbe reveal that in formal contexts, mustanahaline is always used 
instead of neeger. Mustanahaline appears in diverse contexts, while neeger is only listed as a 
part of a subtitle database. Sources using mustanahaline include European Medicines Agency, 
European Parliament Proceedings and EU Law databases. However, this only shows that in 
formal language, neeger is not used. Additional proof of using neeger being a pointed choice 
comes from the fact that uses of neeger are very prevalent on the conservative news page Uued 
Uudised, compared to mainstream media. Neeger is used in 66 articles and mustanahaline in 
21 on this site.  Some examples, “In what sense are neegrid or muslims in Estonia better than 
people from Pihkva or Novgorod who don't even respect us enough to learn Estonian” 
(Massiimmigratsiooniga…, 2018), “if a young woman's throat is slit by a neeger from the 
Congo /--/, then it might be understandable in their own cultural context, since their mentality 
and upbringing prompt this” (Eurooplase…,2019), “one in every ten neegers has got a job /--/ 
but the little value they bring to the table is used to provide for the nine freeloaders” (Eesti…, 
2018). 
 
                                                        
29 Instances of neeger reveal negative attitudes toward black people in the early 20th century. An example from 
Eesti Spordileht, a sports magazine, “/--/ Neegrid who almost always are members of the lousiest group of 
people… /--/  Neegrid hate endurance sports because of their intrinsic laziness” (Neeger Ameerika spordielus, 
1933, p. 153). 
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One could object to this data by claiming that it is not clear that all uses of neeger are negative. 
Arguably, there are situations where neeger is simply used as a general term for black persons. 
An acknowledged Estonian word for denoting the black people in Estonia is negriidne, so it is 
apparent why people might think that neeger is simply a member of the class of negriidne race. 
I will respond to this objection by once again stressing my objective in this thesis – it is to show 
that the necessary conditions satisfied by nigger are also met by neeger. As stated in the 
beginning of section one, I assume proponents of the false friends arguments to reject meaning 
ambiguity and I claim that they fail to show how differences in social context could lead to 
differences in meaning – it is not obvious that there are absolutely no non-derogatory uses of 
nigger;  the established necessary conditions are not demanding enough to rule out ambiguity. 
Whether neeger has a neutral meaning needs further empirical research which is out of the 
scope of this thesis.  
 
Finally, I will consider a general objection – the inappropriate theory counterargument. In this 
thesis, I am assessing whether the conditions assumed by proponents of the false friends 
arguments are supported by the philosophical accounts of slurs outlined here. However, a case 
could be made for the claim that even though these accounts fail to support false friends 
arguments, it is not in principle impossible for there to be an account according to which there 
are relevant differences between Estonia and the anglophone context in the fulfillment of 
necessary conditions for a word to be a slur. In order to truly show that the cultural differences 
argument is unsound, it must be proven that the semantic and pragmatic qualities assumed by 
proponents of these arguments cannot be accounted for by any reasonable theory of slurs. This 
is a possibility that I cannot fully examine due to the scope of this thesis. However, I will briefly 
go through one possible reply to this objection.  
 
In order for a theory to support the assumptions proponents of this argument make, it should 
postulate that for a word to be a slur, people targeted by it must have been legally oppressed 
by the speaker group or in severe conflict with the speakers (see section 1 for reasons Ots and 
Priimägi provide). This is because as previously established, these are the criteria the Estonian 
social context does not fulfil, and it is a central assumption of the false friends argument that 
Estonian indeed fails to satisfy these conditions (P2). I claim that a theory like this would render 
no Estonian word slur-like. This is because Estonia is a country that has been annexed many 
times and been under the force of other nations, yet has never legally controlled any other 
peoples via discriminatory legislation. Of course, there are negative attitudes toward some 
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groups of people because of their race or ethnicity, however, none of these groups has been 
“formally” oppressed by Estonians, there is no history of chattel slavery. Therefore, if this was 
the kind of theory assumed, we would be forced to conclude that there are no derogatory words 
for Russians, Asian and Roma people in Estonian because none have faced the type of 
discrimination required by the theory assumed by false friends arguments. It is highly unlikely 
that kind of theory would satisfy proponents of false friends arguments. Firstly, they seem to 
assume that a category of slur-like words like this does exist in principle – otherwise the 
discussion would be pointless – and secondly, there are intuitively several words that exhibit 
precisely these characteristics. These include, for example, a wide variety of words referring 
to Russians, including venku, tibla, vanka, ivan, sibul, etc., but also words referring to Asians 
(pilu, pilusilm, kili). This provides further support for my claim that it is the argument itself 



































In this final section, I will summarise the main argument of the thesis and proposing some 
future research ideas. In the previous sections, I focused on a kind of false friends arguments 
that stresses the characteristics of the social and cultural context the word appears in. I 
concluded that because the conditions satisfied by nigger and the anglophone context were also 
satisfied by neeger and the Estonian cultural setting, differences in practices did not amount to 
differences in meaning, i.e. neeger cannot be considered a false friend of nigger. This means 
that even if there are accounts of slurs that could support P1 in the cultural differences 
argument, P2 would be shown to be false if P1 is interpreted following these accounts. Showing 
that the false friend relation does not hold does not automatically show that neeger is a slur or 
that it should not be used. It merely implies that neeger and nigger do share significant 
characteristics and offence does not simply arise from the linguistic incompetence of the 
targeted. 
 
Since these debates in Estonian society  continue to arise with the increasing number of racist 
incidents, further exploring the research topic is crucial. I will now outline three potential 
research areas. These include looking into dictionary practices, examining semantic ambiguity 
and the possibility of doing analytic philosophy in Estonian. These topics are worth further 
research from the perspective of this thesis because they provide insight into other possible 
ways false friends arguments could be supported or doubted. 
 
Firstly, I will return to the linguistic authority argument that I dismissed in section 2.1 because 
no examined account of slurs made linguistic markers in dictionaries a necessary condition on 
slur-status. Although in this thesis I did not focus on ways dictionaries could determine 
semantic facts, it would be an interesting research area to look into dictionary practices in 
Estonia and anglophone countries. This comparison could help determine what kind of role 
Estonians ascribe to dictionaries and thus figure out whether there is an interpretation under 
which appealing to a lack of linguistic markers could serve as proof of a word not being slur-
like. Additionally, an analysis of Estonian dictionary entries of words that are conventionally 
believed to be derogatory and people intentionally avoid would shed light on how accurate of 
a record of usage dictionaries really are.  
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Secondly, an issue that was not fully addressed in the first two sections was the possibility that 
neeger is semantically ambiguous. Although the potential existence of non-derogatory uses 
should not lead one to conclude that the arguments put forward in this thesis are pointless –
there are even non-derogatory appropriated uses of nigger –, it would be worth considering 
what kind of ambiguity there might be in case of neeger. For example, following Anderson 
(2018), it might be the case that slurs are used to perform two kinds of different speech acts, 
i.e. calling and addressing. It is also possible that slurs might be presuppositionally ambiguous 
(Sennet, 2016). In any case, to refine linguistic intuitions, the judgments of Estonian speakers 
as well as those targeted by neeger should also be examined. 
 
Finally, in this thesis I have shown that four accounts of slurs consider the social context of 
both Estonia and anglophone countries to be such that it satisfies the criteria for a word in said 
context to be a slur. However, besides a brief note on the omitted theories, I have not touched 
upon why accounts centred around CIs or presuppositions have not been explicitly addressed 
in this thesis. One reason for this is that the ‘tests’ these two accounts use to assess slurs include 
comparing how their derogatory aspect scopes out under negation, in conditionals, etc. 
However, it is unclear whether the linguistic constructions in Estonian straightforwardly model 
those in English (e.g. kui…siis vs if…then). This poses a larger question for analytical 
philosophy done in different languages. According to Pérez (2018, p. 10), “language is not a 
neutral vehicle for our thoughts”. It might be the case that in my analysis of Estonian and 
English words I have not paid enough attention to how the different languages themselves 
affect the ideas, concepts and proposals put forward. Altogether these remarks point to a 
necessity for refining our understanding of formal semantics for Estonian in the future. 
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Eesti keeles ei ole vastet sõnale slur, mis inglise keeles viitab halvustava tähendusvarjundiga 
sõnale, mille sihtmärgiks võivad olla näiteks eri rassidest, rahvustest või seksuaalse 
orientatsiooniga inimesed. Bakalaureusetöö keskne uurimiseesmärk on võrrelda Eesti meedias 
poleemikat tekitanud sõna neeger omadusi ingliskeelse sõna nigger omadega. Ingliskeelse 
sõna semantilisi omadusi kirjeldavad keelefilosoofilised vaenunimede teooriad (accounts of 
slurs), mille järgi on teatavad sõna omadused või selle sotsiaalse konteksti omapärad, milles 
sõna esineb, tarvilikud tingimused, et seda pidada vaenusõnaks, st ka halvustavaks, solvavaks 
ja keelatuks. Töös kaitsen väidet, et kõik tarvilikud tingimused, mida rahuldab nigger, on 
täidetud ka sõna neeger poolt.  
 
Eesti meedias on korduvalt väidetud (Pullerits, 2013; Priimärgi, 2013; Ots, 2012), et neeger ei 
ole halvustav termin, ent võib sellisena näida tulenevalt foneetilisest ja grammatilisest 
sarnasusest ingliskeelse vaenusnimega – sellised sõnapaarid, mis on kõlalt sarnased, ent 
tähenduselt erinevad, on virvasõnad. Kõigi virvasõna argumentide ühine tunnus on, et 
vaenunime staatuse omistamiseks peavad olema täidetud teatud tingimused – sõna peab 
esinema kindlas sotsiaalses kontekstis või olema sõnaraamatus lingvistilise markeriga; Eesti ja 
neeger väidetavalt neid kriteeriumeid ei täida. Tõestamaks, et argumendid ei ole tõesed, 
kirjeldan töös nelja filosoofilist  vaadet: tõetingimuslikku teooriat (Hom 2008, 2010, 2012), 
perspektiivikeskset teooriat (Camp, 2013; 2018), diskursuse rollide teooriat (Popa-Wyatt ja 
Wyatt, 2018) ja grupikuuluvuse teooriat (Nunberg, 2018). Töös näitan, et juhul kui need 
teooriad sobivad paradigmaatilise vaenusõna nigger’i omaduste kirjeldamiseks, on need 
kriteeriumid relevantsed ka neegri omaduste kirjeldamisel; lisaks on postuleeritud vaenunime 
staatuse omistamise tingimused täidetud. Viimaks kaalun võimalikke edasisi uurimissuundi, 






















1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to 
 
reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives 
until the expiry of the term of copyright, 
 
Slur or False Friend? An Assessment of "False Friends” Arguments, 
  
 
supervised by Alexander Stewart Davies, 
 
 
2.    I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the 
public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital 
archives, under the Creative Commons licence CC BY NC ND 3.0, which allows, by 
giving appropriate credit to the author, to reproduce, distribute the work and communicate 
it to the public, and prohibits the creation of derivative works and any commercial use of 
the work until the expiry of the term of copyright. 
 
3.  I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1 and 2. 
 
4.  I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ 






Helo Liis Soodla 
11/05/2019 
 
 
 
 
